"Why do Neorealists argue that states often pay more attention to relative gains than to absolute gains in their interaction with other states, and how does this affect the overall level of international exchange and cooperation?"

Wrote this in first year when I really didnt know how to write an essay. Forgive me. Just thought that it might help somebody out when they are writing on something similar. Loved International Relations and Politics. Wish I had stuck at it instead of bloody French.

Neorealism first came to the fore in the late seventies when Kenneth Waltz published his book, Theory of International Politics. While Waltz worked from the base which relism had created, he emphasized some areas which he felt realism didn't and he refuted the behaviourist notion that states acted the way that they do because of man's innate search for power. Neo realist tend to be seen to take a pessimistic and prudential view of International Relations (Elman, 2001). In this essay, I first try to explain why neorelists look for relative gains over absolute gains and then I look at the level of interaction among states keeping in mind the perennial search for relative gains among states.

Despite claims by realists, neorealists don't believe that states are more interested in relative gains because they thirst for power for power's sake.They believe power is a means to an end, the end being security. States care only for relative gains because by gaining relatively they can ensure their security (Glenn, Howlett and Poore, 2004). It is important to define power. It is not simply their military capability or size but, as Kenneth Waltz puts it the “economic, military, and other capabilities of Nations” He goes on later to say “Their rank [of power] depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (all in Waltz, 1979). Waltz makes it clear that states are not ranked on how they do on one but, on all the items collectively.

States pay more attention to relative gains for two main reasons. Firstly, the system in which states operate is anarchaic. States in an anarchaic system must provide for their own security. States become proccupied with identifying dangers and trying to counteracting them becomes routine. Relations between two states, actors in the anarchaic system, are tense, with states constantly weary of other actors. This paranoia may result in hostility among states (Waltz, 1997).

Secondly, neorealists claim that states favour relative gains as opposed to absolute gains is because in an anarchaic system in which one states gain is another's worry. For example, a state ammassing arms only for it's own security maybe seen as a threat to other states. While individually states maybe doing only what they can to ensure their security, collectively those actions may result in arms races. We also see when a defence alliance is formed, an opposing alliance may be provoked into countermeasures.

Neorealists believe that the level of interactions between states will differ depending on the system, be it unipolar, bi-polar or multi-polar. They beleive that in a system in which states are only concerned with relative gains cooperation between two actors is difficult. When two states care only for relative gain, their relations can be modelled as a zero sum game -where one state's gain is offset by another's loss- with no room for cooperation. States fear that today's friend could well be tomorrow's enemy. They care little for how they fare themselves but how well they fare in comparison to others. (Snidal, 1991). International cooperation and exchange between two actors is outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Relations (1979):

When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure

must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “Will both of us

gain?" but “Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities. (Waltz, 1979)

In addition to this, Realists see sovereign states as the only important units within an anarchaic international cooperation system. By being an anarchaic system, by having no supranational actor “cooperation is made difficult because agreements cannot be centrally enforced” (Snidal, 1991) meaning that states can walk out of agreements which are no longer attractive to them.

While we see that cooperation between two actors is difficult, cooperation among many actors is somewhat easier. “The number of states to which a state compares itself to can change the severity of the relative gains problem” (Grieco, Powell and Snidal, 1993) . As the number of states to which a state compares itself to decreses then the severity of the relative gains problem. States care less about relative gains.

"If it is uncertain about which partners would do relatively better, the state will prefer more partners, for larger numbers would enhance the likelihood that relative gains advantaging (what turn out to be) better-positioned partners could be offset by more favorable sharings arising from interactions with (as matters develop) weaker partners" (Grieco, 1990; 228)

In a unipolarity system, which is perhaps the most peaceful state of affairs within the system which states interact. In this system, the hegemon of the region or world, will feel as if it is acting for greater peace It will sometimes act as as the World Police, which might appear “arbitrary and high handed” to some weaker states. This will prompt these weaker states to act to restore the system to a bi- or multi- polarity system by cooperating with each other. (Waltz, 1997).

While the vast majority of states care of relative gains, for very secure and very weak states, the quest for absolute gains may prevail over relative gains. Very weak states cannot make themselves secure alone so do not try very hard. On the other extreme, the more secure states fear less for their security and begin to pursue more absolute gains. The U.S. Have claimed to try and bring liberty and democracy to states during their time as the hegemon. This will continue until the state begins to lose out relatively to other states and the state begins to disregard absolute gains and turns their attention back to relative gains.

This essay, I hope, clearly outlines why neorealists claim that states look for relative gains over absolute gains and how this affects the level of intenational exchange and cooperation in international relations. While there have been many critics of neorealism and many changes in the international relations structure since Kenneth Waltz formulated it, the theory continues to be as relevant today as it ever did.

Bibliography:

Elman, C. (2001) ‘History, theory and the democratic peace,’ The International History Review 23: 757–66

Glenn, J., Howlett, D and Poore, S. (2004). Neorealism versus strategic culture . London: Ashgate. pp. 23.

Grieco, J., Powell, R. and Snidal, D.. (1993). The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 87 (No. 3), pp. [727]-743.

Grieco, J. (1990). Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade. New York: Cornell Uni. Press. pp. 228

Powell, R. (1991). Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory. American Political Science Review. Vol. 85 (No. 4), pp. 1303-1320

Snidal, D. (Sept 1991). Relative Gains and The Pattern of International Cooperation. The American Political Science Review. 85 (No. 3 ), pp. 701-726.

Waltz, K. (1997). Evaluating Theories. American Political Science Review. Vol. 91 (No. 4), pp. 913-917.

Waltz, K. (1988). The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History. Vol. 18 (No. 4), pp. 615-628.

Waltz K. (1979) Theory of International Politics. McGraw Hill. New York: 1979.